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Will Terrorist Attacks on Air Cargo Have an Impact 
on World Trade? [1]
Thomas Biermann
Zusammenfassung
Luftfracht stellt einen wichtigen Teil des zivilen Luftver-
kehrs dar und spielte eine zentrale Rolle für das Wachs-
tum des Welthandels im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. 
International tätige Terroristen sind sich mittlerweile die-
ser Bedeutung bewusst und griffen 2010 von Jemen aus 
den Luftverkehr erstmals direkt über die Luftfracht an. In 
diesem Beitrag werden die Besonderheiten der Luftfracht 
unter dem Blickwinkel der Gefahrenabwehr diskutiert. Es 
zeigt sich, dass trotz verschärfter Sicherheitsmaßnahmen 
ein Restrisiko verbleibt – doch könnte ein Überziehen der 
Sicherheitsanforderungen noch größere Schäden durch 
ein Abwürgen der Welthandelsströme bewirken. 
Abstract
Air Cargo forms a signifi cant part of civil aviation and 
played a central role in the growth of world trade in 
the era of globalisation. International terrorists have 
become aware of this importance and launched their 
fi rst direct attack from Yemen in 2010. In this paper 
the characteristics of air cargo in regard to security is-
sues will be discussed. It can be shown that a certain 
amount of risk remains in spite of improved protec-
tion strategies, but tightening security restrictions too 
much could have an even worse impact by strangling 
world trade fl ows. 
1  Introduction
Terrorism has been a serious issue for civil aviation since 
the 1960ies and entered worldwide public awareness in 
the 1970ies. The events of September 2001 resulted in 
a severe global tightening of security regarding passen-
gers. Despite a range of creative attempts by terrorists 
(including hidden bombs in soft drink bottles, shoes 
and underpants) international aviation has until now 
dealt successfully with this threat. 
But the authorities as well as the general public tend 
to neglect the vulnerability of the second important 
part of the aviation business: air cargo. This sector can 
easily be identifi ed as a new inviting target for attacks. 
In 2010 the last-minute detection of two bomb pack-
ages aboard commercial aircraft showed that terrorists 
fi nally have become aware of this angle – forcing secu-
rity experts to develop innovative solutions in the face 
of new risks. 
Air Cargo forms a backbone of world trade. As air-
borne logistics are extremely sensitive to disturbances 
by complicated and time-consuming procedures, pro-
tection poses a diffi cult problem. A specifi c strategy 
against terrorist threats has to be built up keeping se-
curity needs and the economic benefi ts of free-fl owing 
world trade in a reasonable balance. 
2  The Air Cargo Business
2.1  Air Cargo in Early Aviation History
Even inside the aviation industry most people are hard-
ly aware of the fact that their business actually began 
with the transport of goods, starting with mail fl ights 
in the USA as early as 1910 with regular routes taken up 
1918 in the USA and 1919 in Europe (Wensveen 2007). 
After World War I some dismissed fi ghter pilots bought 
out-of-service planes to offer fast transport for letters, 
documents and small parcels. Their planes made of 
strings and textiles were not equipped for passengers – 
and who would have dared to take a ride in such a fl imsy 
construction anyway? It took some years until the mid 
1920ies and a new generation of aircraft specifi cally de-
signed for commercial use in passenger transport to get 
off the ground (Biermann 1986).
During World War II aircraft proved to be a powerful 
and reliable mode of transport for people and military 
goods. They could be used to carry tons of payload over 
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very long distances, which was especially important for 
the US forces fi ghting on two fronts far away from the 
mainland. After the war the Berlin airlift operations in 
1948/49 helped to overcome the blockade of the city by 
Soviet block authorities, American and British forces 
fl ew in 15000 tons of food, fuel and clothing per day for 
a period of eleven months.
Ten years later the fi rst long-range airliners with jet 
engines entered service – giving birth to the modern air 
cargo business. With a jet it is possible to fl y at much 
higher altitudes (10 – 15 000 m) than with a propel-
ler, making the cruise more comfortable as the plane 
is travelling above the clouds and winds. But these air-
craft need a pressurized cabin to keep crew and passen-
gers alive. As the pressure inside is higher than outside 
a considerable amount of stress has to be taken by the 
fuselage, which must be constructed as a cylindrical 
tube to minimize the danger of air leakages and break-
ing seams. A deck for passenger seats has to be installed, 
leaving unused space underneath. Airlines offer this 
space for cargo transport to generate extra revenue 
on fl ights already paid for by the passengers (Morrell 
2011). 
2.2  Air Cargo in the Wide-Body Age
Up to the 1970ies air cargo was still very expensive and 
an option only for shippers with an absolute priority on 
speed (Chiavi 2005) like emergency deliverance (impor-
tant spare parts for example), perishables (fresh seafood) 
or extremely valuable goods (works of art). In 1970 the 
fi rst wide-body aircraft took up commercial service. 
With a cross-section diameter of 6,50 m – in comparison 
to less than 4 m in a conventional narrow-body model 
– the Boeing 747 could seat up to ten passengers in one 
row giving a total capacity of more than 500 seats. In-
creasing the fuselage diameter increased the belly space 
underneath the main deck signifi cantly.
Fig. 1: Belly Freight – Narrow-Body and Wide-Body Aircraft
With wide-body aircraft dominating the interconti-
nental routes the additional supply of air cargo capac-
ity brought the freight rates down to a level at which 
air transport could compete successfully with sea ship-
ping. In several markets the demand was big enough to 
allow pure freighter operations in an all-cargo version 
of the Boeing 747 with a payload capacity of 100 tons. 
As a third option the so-called combi version featured 
passenger seats in the front section of the plane and an 
additional cargo compartment in the back of the main 
deck with a special side cargo door (Morrell 2011). 
2.3  Air Cargo and Globalisation
In spite of a steep decline of air cargo rates since the 
introduction of wide-body aircraft – they are now less 
than half the amount in real terms in comparison to 
1969 (Boeing 2010) – sending a container by air still is 
up to ten times more expensive than maritime trans-
port. But taking into account the capital cost of the 
inventory taking the slow route aboard a ship shippers 
will profi t by choosing air cargo whenever their goods 
have a high value per kilogram, for example electron-
ics, machinery and even toys and fashionable textiles 
(Reinhold et al. 2011). The modal split share of air cargo 
in international trade regarding tonnage still looks tiny 
(2  %), but its share of the value of transported goods 
is 35 – 40  % of the total international trade turnover 
(WTO data given by Pompl 2007). 
Fig. 2: Relative Growth GDP/World Trade/Air Cargo
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According to World Bank statistics in the 30 year pe-
riod 1970 – 2000 world GDP (gross domestic product) 
grew by 154  % (price adjusted $), the trade volume by 
355  % (dito) and the air cargo volume (measured in 
freight ton-kilometres) by 1395  % (Kasarda et al. 2004). 
For the future we may expect air cargo traffi c volume 
to triple again in the next 20 years with the highest 
growth rates in the markets to/from and inside Asia 
(Boeing 2010). 
The majority of airlines with a long haul network car-
ry belly freight in their passenger planes and some also 
operate all-cargo aircraft (e. g. Lufthansa, Air France, 
Cathay Pacifi c). There also exists a number of inde-
pendent cargo airlines fl ying freighters exclusively (e. g. 
Cargolux, CAL, Jade). Integrators offering transport 
chains including ground transport and distribution (as 
UPS, FedEx, DHL and TNT) have specialized on fast and 
reliable regular express transport of parcels which can 
be handled by one man alone without special equip-
ment – their average shipment weight is only 5.3 kg. 
For many customers in manufacturing and services 
these integrators fi gure as a main element in their just-
in-time logistics (Boeing 2010).
3  Aviation and Terrorism 
3.1  Moving Targets
Aircraft share a curious fate with other new modes of 
transport in history: they attracted the attention of 
criminals as soon as the general public started to get 
aboard. Prohibition-time gangsters in the USA were 
early adaptors of light airplanes for smuggling or escap-
ing. Hi-jacking of an airplane – getting illegitimate ac-
cess by violently disposing of the original owners – was 
fi rst observed in a revolution in Peru in 1931. Entering 
the fl ight-deck of an airliner with a weapon and forcing 
the pilot to change his course became rather common 
from 1958 onwards. About fi ve incidents per year were 
recorded until 1967 and grew to 38 in 1968 and a his-
toric peak of 82 cases in 1969. Until 1977 the average 
annual number of »sky-jackings« was an astonishing 41 
per year (www.wikipedia.com). 
This phenomenon is easy to understand by thinking 
from a »black hat« point of view, as an airliner has a high 
symbolic value. The passengers will usually comprise a 
certain number of high-status people and therefore can 
be used as »bargaining chips« if taken hostage. Because 
during fl ight an aircraft (especially a pressurized jet) is 
extremely vulnerable to damage, even small a hand-
gun forms a convincing threat aboard. 
3.2  Motivation and Opportunity 
The motives for a hi-jacking include frustrated employ-
ees and desperate lunatics (Schiehll 2002), but political 
motives play a major role in most cases in aviation. Dur-
ing the Cold War a hi-jacked plane crossing the Iron 
Curtain was regarded as a propaganda victory by the 
receiving country. US planes were taken over and redi-
rected to Cuba, but there were Cuban fugitives as well 
diverting planes to the United States, where they could 
hope to be celebrated as heroes. A similar situation was 
observed in the China/Taiwan confl ict (www.airdisas-
ter.com). From 1968 onwards the Israeli national air-
line El Al became a prime target for Palestine terrorist 
attempts. The main objective at that time was to use air-
craft, passengers and crew in exchange for imprisoned 
comrades in Israel or Europe.
The bargaining position of the terrorists is strong-
est while the aircraft is airborne. The aviation security 
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Fig. 3: The Air Cargo Transport Chain 
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experts across the world therefore agreed to a common 
strategy stipulating that the safest way to deal with »sky-
jacking« was to instruct the crew to fulfi l all requests of 
armed offenders until the aircraft was safely sitting at 
an airport – any airport. Code words were distributed 
to fl ight crews and air traffi c controllers to signal high-
jacking details via normal in-fl ight communication 
routines without the perpetrators` knowledge. After 
landing the security forces would negotiate for the free-
dom of the hostages while preparing a surprise coun-
ter-attack with special troops and a fair chance to save 
innocent life. Famous counter-attack/rescue operations 
in Entebbe (Uganda) by Israeli in 1976 and Mogadishu 
(Somalia) by German special forces in 1977 demon-
strated the viability of this approach (www.aviation-
safety.net).
3.3  Total Destruction
Total destruction of an aircraft en-route by a bomb hid-
den in the luggage compartment in a suitcase primed 
to explode at a certain time or altitude also has a sad 
long history starting with a suspected gangland murder 
in 1933. But today in this type of crime the motive usu-
ally also is a political one. Recent bombings or attempt-
ed bombings were performed by Palestine terrorists or 
their supporters targeting Israel and its allies, mainly 
the USA. The destruction of a Pan American Boeing 747 
with 270 victims in the airspace above Lockerbie (Scot-
land) in 1988 is the best known example. But terrorists 
from India and North Korea have also managed to bring 
down airliners in a spectacular manner 1985 and 1987 
respectively (www.aviation-safety.net).
Counter-measures against a bomb in the luggage-de-
partment or a carry-on bag were developed mainly by 
Israeli security experts. Their starting point was a strict 
policy that no suitcase should travel aboard without 
its rightful owner sitting in that aircraft and probing 
whether a third party had an opportunity to hide an ex-
plosive device in a suitcase. Passengers travelling to or 
from Israel have to endure an intensive interview with 
offi cers specially trained to observe involuntary facial 
»microexpressions« before checking in their suitcases. 
Screening bags and people by X-Ray (and by hand in 
case of suspicion) is international standard procedure 
now, but Israeli security agents also put every bag into a 
decompression chamber to cause an eventual pressure-
directed device to ignite. In spite of being the number 
one target for decades no El Al aircraft has come to harm 
from a terrorist attack since 1970.
3.4  The Last Resort: Suicide Attacks
The chosen counter-counter strategy of the terrorists 
looks like a pretty desperate effort to the rational Eu-
ropean: the suicide attack. Clutching your enemy and 
going down with him has no precedence in Western 
warfare – except in some rare instances where the he-
roes did not have a realistic survival alternative any-
way. The history of planned voluntary suicide attacks 
in modern times has been restricted to the Kamikaze 
pilots in Japan during the last stages of World War II – 
besides some isolated cases of madmen running amok 
in the hope of being killed in the course of their ac-
tion. 
Until 2001 security experts in Western countries re-
garded the suicide attack as an option only for a small 
number of half-crazy people without education and 
no future job or status perspectives against easy-to-
reach targets on the ground. The high-tech arena of 
international aviation was regarded as practically im-
mune against the approach of a farm boy with a ruck-
sack fi lled with explosives and nails. Common wisdom 
maintained that a clever terrorist would always look 
for an escape route for himself – a suicidal terrorist by 
defi nition was a nitwit unable to get near a promising 
target. Even in a highly hierarchical organized and reli-
giously motivated extremist group a well trained intel-
ligent warrior would be much too valuable to waste in a 
kamikaze-like assault. 
In September 2001 this conviction was shaken, as a 
group of 19 jihadists hi-jacked four airliners in the USA 
simultaneously and transformed them into weapons 
by fl ying two of them into the World Trade Centre in 
New York City and one into the Pentagon building in 
Washington, D.C., losing the fourth (also re-directed 
towards Washington, D.C.) to a surprise recapture at-
tempt of passengers resulting in a crash in an open fi eld 
in Pennsylvania. 
This dramatic multiple hit pattern shattered the 
dogma that a sophisticated terrorist will never oper-
ate without an escape route. Intelligent suicide bomb-
ers with specialist training (e. g. in piloting) formed a 
threat against which no remedy was known (Brown 
2010). Fortunately no further attacks of the 2001 cali-
bre have occurred. In the last decade several suicidal 
attempts against aviation failed or were prevented be-
cause the perpetrators proved to be not up to their task – 
restoring some reputation to the »suicidal-simpleton«-
dogma. The shoe-bomber of December 2001 aboard an 
American Airlines fl ight from Paris to Miami unsuccess-
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fully tried three times to light up the explosive mate-
rial hidden in his footwear until the cabin crew stopped 
him (www.aviation-safety.net). 
4  How to Cope with Terrorism 
in Aviation 
4.1  Three Walls
Aviation nowadays is protected by three »city walls«. 
First there is a general police look-out for any kind of 
potential terrorists by telephone surveillance or recruit-
ing informers. The middle wall is the entrance control 
to the sensitive areas at the airport and the inner wall 
is the citadel inside the airplane: the reinforced door 
to the fl ight deck (possibly watched by armed air-mar-
shals) forms the last barrier to a World-Trade-Centre 
type of attack. 
The most important aviation-specifi c defence meas-
ure is the second one: sealing off sensitive airport areas. 
There is a well guarded borderline between the »air-
side« (the airfi eld and parts of the terminal as for ex-
ample departure gates) and the uncritical »land-side«. 
Passing into the air-side area is feasible only at specifi c 
transfer points, where passengers, crews and airport 
workers will be checked for weapons or components 
which might be transformed into weapons later. Goods 
will also be examined, for example duty free merchan-
dise or food and beverages for onboard consumption or 
airside bars and lounges. 
This check is done by scanner machines leading to 
manual »frisking« only if a suspicious article is identi-
fi ed, for example the telltale silhouette of a handgun 
or a knife. The watchers are also on the lookout for a 
cluster of articles which might be the components nec-
essary to construct a bomb: a triggering device, a source 
of energy for the ignition, the connecting wires and of 
course the explosive material itself, which on its own 
is fi endishly diffi cult to detect – especially in the very 
small amounts deemed suffi cient to destruct an aircraft 
in fl ight (less than 100 g in the case of high perform-
ance military material). Passengers may be monitored 
by hidden cameras to detect unusual behaviour due to 
nervousness, sometimes sniffer dogs trained to fi nd ex-
plosives will be deployed. 
4.2  A Bottleneck Problem
In any case such a security checkpoint forms an irri-
tating bottleneck, slowing the fl ow of passengers and 
giving headaches to airport planners and airline man-
agers. There is a debate whether the survey technique 
known as profi ling should be used in this context: con-
centrating search efforts on persons belonging to a de-
mographic group with an above average probability of 
terrorist activism (say young men with dark eyes) would 
speed up the process, as non-suspicious travellers (eld-
erly ladies of fair complexion) could pass through a fast-
line with just a quick perfunctory check. 
But in Europe and North America this kind of pas-
senger profi ling is hardly used in practice: it could be re-
garded as an unjust discrimination against the selected 
demographic/ethnic group, leading to anger and frus-
tration – and thus maybe even aiding the recruitment 
of new terrorists. On the other hand profi ling is mis-
take-prone: terrorists can pay innocent-looking people 
to carry weapons to an air-side waiting room while the 
suspicious-looking attackers themselves enter the sen-
sitive area »clean« and then take over the material. 
But profi ling in regard to behaviour rather than 
to demographic criteria can be helpful. A passenger 
booked on an intercontinental fl ight with a one-way 
ticket paid in cash and without any luggage probably 
deserves a closer look. Watching out for very nervous 
persons can also give hints towards the need of closer 
inspection, thus detecting not only potential terror-
ists but also drug-smugglers or criminals on the run. A 
suicide-bent jihadist is not a cool professional gangland 
killer, but rather a semi-deranged desperate expecting 
to go to his paradise in the next few hours – he will be 
under considerable and detectable psychic stress. 
5  Air Cargo in the Terrorists Focus
5.1  Why Attack Cargo?
Generally air-side sealing at the airport has proved quite 
effective, although it is troublesome and sometimes 
humiliating for the travelling public. Strike attempts 
against civil aviation have been in decline, but due to its 
symbolic value an airliner still is a most attractive target 
for terrorists. But there is a door still slightly open for 
sabotage: air cargo. Contrary to public perception not 
all cargo pieces aboard an airplane – even a passenger 
plane – have undergone a security check by the authori-
ties in the past (Gehrke 2010).
Smuggling an explosive device aboard an airplane 
via the cargo hold has distinct advantages from the ter-
rorist viewpoint:
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 the perpetrator will be far away from the explosion, 
with a good chance of getting away undetected,
 the barriers to access are easier to surmount than 
the strict protection measures in passenger traffi c, 
because there are many parties involved in transport 
and transfer,
 with hundreds of packages of different sizes, forms, 
weights, origins and destinations consolidated on a 
palette or in a container the sheer volume of material 
makes it almost impossible to examine them all. 
On the other hand one cannot know exactly on which 
fl ight a consignment will travel, so it is hard to specify 
a target and to prime a time-bomb accordingly. An ex-
plosion in an airport warehouse would be a disappoint-
ing counter-climax from the terrorist point of view. As-
saulting aviation from the cargo angle requires diligent 
planning and some knowledge about this business.
5.2  A Wake-Up Call in 2010
In October 2010 two parcels containing computer 
printers with explosives hidden in the toner cartridge 
were sent from Yemen to addresses in Chicago. They 
were intercepted – the fi rst at a UK airport and the sec-
ond in Dubai – after security forces had a tip-off from a 
turncoat informer. The terrorists probably had checked 
out the routes such packages would take by sending 
some goods in September and following their path via 
Internet-tracking (Gebauer 2010). 
Air cargo carriers and integrators offer their custom-
ers tracking of their relevant shipments: by using a spe-
cial password the customer can get a sneak view into the 
cargo carriers computer-system and gain detailed infor-
mation in which phase of the voyage his parcel is at the 
moment (e. g. »truck-to-the airport«, »warehouse«, »air-
plane«, »truck-from-the-airport«, »fi nal destination«). 
The Yemen incident proved to be a wake-up call for 
security authorities in Europe and the USA. A catastro-
phe was avoided by luck alone: even after the informa-
tion on the bomb had been acquired it proved diffi cult 
to stop its progress. When it was fi nally retrieved in East 
Midlands airport in Great Britain the experts were at 
fi rst unable to fi nd the explosives hidden in the dusty 
material in the toner cartridge. »Just in case« they dis-
jointed the cartridge from the printer thus unwittingly 
defusing the bomb set to explode three hours later. 
After this incident air cargo security gained high prior-
ity status. As is often the case in dramatic near-misses 
many ideas for improvement were offered. But most of 
them would not work at all, work only against a threat 
exactly identical to the Yemen incident, or would dis-
rupt air cargo and world trade in a manner even worse 
than a successful hit had done. Some politicians for ex-
ample suggested a general ban of cargo in a passenger 
plane belly (Gebauer 2010). 
6  Assessing Risks in Air Cargo
6.1  Security Relevant Characteristics
Analysing the security risks in air cargo we may profi t 
from the lessons learnt in passenger transport. But ac-
tually there is only one thing that passengers and cargo 
have in common: both are transported in aircraft. In 
most other aspects the transport of cargo is quite a dif-
ferent kind of business (Otto 2005):
 Cargo needs a parallel fl ow of information (freight bill 
in paper or as a data set) with the physical goods (the 
shipment itself), whereas passengers are intelligent 
agents knowing their way by carrying the necessary 
information with them (memorized fl ight schedule, 
ticket);
 Cargo has to be handled and carried for each tran-
saction, passengers walk to/from the plane on their 
own;
 Cargo has its customers only at the point of origin 
and/or destination (sender and consignee), in pas-
senger transport the customer is also the »item in 
transport«;
 Cargo comes in very different forms (sizes, weights, 
need of temperature control or special care as dan-
gerous goods or living animals), passengers are quite 
homogenous in comparison and can be fi tted in one 
standardized »loading unit« – the seat;
 Cargo shipments often are bundled in palettes or 
containers, so that a small parcel is hard to identify 
Sanaa
Dubai
Cologne
East Midlands
Philadelphia
Chicago
Shipment
Intercepted
Figure 4: Route of fi rst Yemen Air Cargo Bomb 
(dotted line: planned further route)
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and isolate, individual passengers on the other hand 
will always be identifi able;
 Cargo will travel on its pre-determined path, the 
customer will not change his plans after sending his 
shipment, passengers are fl exible and may decide to 
change their connections at any point during their 
trip;
 Cargo is tolerant against changes of fl ights and rou-
tings by the carrier, passengers will have to be persu-
aded to change their plans if the airline so desires;
 Cargo is almost exclusively a business-to-business 
venture, in passenger services you have to deal with 
companies – sending business travellers – as well as 
individual consumers or consumer groups in the 
case of leisure travel (Otto 2005).
6.2  Profi ling Shipments
Air cargo security could be achieved without seriously 
disrupting international trade fl ows – at least in theory: 
if a thorough check of the documentation is realized, 
there is no need to inspect the physical goods if the 
integrity of the shipment can be guaranteed in every 
stage of the journey – ensuring that it contains exactly 
what the documentation claims. 
In this business-to-business environment the vast 
majority of transactions will be done by a relatively 
small number of major customers. Routine shipments 
delivered by trustworthy partners (companies, forward-
ers) can be regarded as safe, as far as it is assured that 
these shippers have taken all the necessary precautions 
to protect their merchandise against third-party ma-
nipulation. Air cargo customers with a certifi ed secu-
rity system – called »known shippers« – can have their 
container units and shrink-wrapped palettes accepted 
without closer inspection (Elias 2007). Of course a 
monitoring of their security systems by the authorities 
will be necessary and regular checks of samples will be 
performed, but the bulk of shipments may fl ow with-
out time-consuming physical screening. Only packages 
brought in by customers not in the »known shipper« 
database have to be examined in detail. 
In air cargo profi ling of shipments can be done with-
out damaging the dignity of demographic groups by 
discrimination. This can be illustrated by default in 
the Yemen incident: why would someone send offi ce 
equipment from this country (which does not manu-
facture any) to Jewish institutions in the USA? Nobody 
thought of asking this simple common-sense question 
as the parcels were accepted. 
Airlines could install computer program screening 
their airway bills with an algorithm designed to de-
tect suspicious patterns and so identify candidates for 
a closer look by human experts at the documentation 
and an X-ray device at the physical goods. Programs of 
this kind are already available in other areas of secu-
rity: credit card companies for example detect sudden 
changes of behaviour in the card use pattern of their in-
dividual customers and take this as an indicator of theft 
or fraud. But this idea seems stymied by the fact that 
documentation in air cargo is still predominantly done 
in paper and not in electronic form (Ehrler 2011).
6.3  Ensuring Integrity
A parcel bound to travel aboard a plane goes a long 
way without much chance of close observation. Tradi-
tional security measures were focussing on the danger 
of theft – someone taking something out of the ship-
ment. But in our context the main danger is that of 
someone putting something in – a bomb. Putting all 
merchandise in a locked container and wrapping all 
open palettes with shrinking foil is common practice. 
Special seals will also be applied, »electronic seals« us-
ing RFID-technology are becoming very popular. But as 
weight is an issue in aeronautics, an air cargo container 
is a lightweight construction and not a fortifi ed vault, 
so a chance for tampering will remain.
There is an additional risk to integrity: in Europe a 
huge amount of air cargo is transported by trucks, as 
only wide-body aircraft offer suffi cient capacity for car-
rying it. The long-range routes served by these aircraft 
are concentrated on a small number of big airports like 
Frankfurt, Amsterdam or Paris. To offer a convenient 
»cargo product« all over the country the airlines oper-
ate »road feeder«-services: shipments can be delivered 
to a local airport to be transported by a truck operated 
under the responsibility of the airline (with a »fl ight 
number«) to the main airport, where it is transferred to 
the long haul-service. Usually there is no threat to car-
go integrity »in-fl ight« as long as a real airplane is the 
mode of transport. But if a container is accepted as air 
cargo and then has to travel 200 km on the road it can 
be the object of manipulation, if a truck driver takes a 
break or is an accomplice in the felony. 
Securing integrity of the shipments by physical in-
spection before transferring it into a safe air-side ware-
house is a time-consuming diffi cult task, so all the par-
ticipants in the transport chain have tried to avoid it, 
for example by using the »known shipper«-regulation. 
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In the last few years new machines have become avail-
able for physical screening by X-ray or similar technol-
ogy up to »drive-through«-solutions, where trucks can 
pass under a special X-ray equipped arc (www.rapiscan-
systems.com). In the near future we may expect that all 
cargo items will be put to the same screening that carry-
on-bags have to undergo at the airport.
6.4  Employees as a Risk Factor
The gravest danger in security is the inside job – the par-
ticipation of a member of the »victim organisation« in 
the crime. The probability of such an occurrence might 
be low, but the consequences would be very severe. In 
passenger services the risk of employee participation in 
terrorist acts should be negligible: ground crews – for 
example at the check-in gates – have to work with a lot 
of communication between team members as well as 
customers. It is not very probable that the smiling air-
line staffer giving out the boarding pass will smuggle a 
bomb into a suitcase the passenger just handed over. A 
terrorist playing the role of a loyal employee in this en-
vironment is rather hard to imagine. 
The situation is quite different in cargo operations: 
all items have to be moved and will be stored for hours 
or even days. This puts up a hazard not only during 
the journey to the airport but also inside the perim-
eter. There is a lot of manual labour to be done – and 
in a seasonal business many part-time helpers are in-
volved. Why not persuade an employee with access to 
the goods to hide a little something in a container? It 
is a well known (although not widely published) fact 
that criminal gangs are quite successful in infi ltrating 
air cargo operations where valuable and easy to conceal 
merchandise can be got at. Maritime ports and some 
international airports have a long tradition as hotspots 
for organized crime (www.mafi atoday.com).
Terrorists might entrap a bona-fi de worker into co-
operation by bribe or blackmail. They could also apply 
for jobs with an appropriate set of forged (or even real) 
papers. Of course there are screening processes for all 
people aspiring to work inside an airport, but until now 
this has not been a very diligent check for low-level car-
go workers never bound to come near the airplanes. 
Infi ltrating an air cargo facility in preparation for an 
attack still looks a realistic scenario. In most European 
countries it would not be too diffi cult to fi nd suitable 
individuals with a clean curriculum vitae and let them 
work innocently for several months until they know 
their ways around and the time has come to place an 
explosive device. Stricter screening of applicants is 
not a solution, because the political, social and ethical 
problems discussed in regard to profi ling of passengers 
arise also if you look at employees. A young Muslim stu-
dent sporting a big beard is looking for a summer job 
as a forklift operator in air cargo – should the human 
resource department turn him down just on the basis 
of general suspicion of bad intent?
7  Conclusions and recommendations
Fast and reliable intercontinental transport for people 
and goods today is a main prerequisite for global trade. 
In the past the obstacles to world trade have been tech-
nological (slow and fragile means of transport in the 
early days of ocean shipping) or administrative (duties 
and import restrictions). By overcoming these obstacles 
the world has gained huge economic benefi ts. They are 
endangered by terrorist threats – and by the risk of over-
tightening the security reigns out of fear. International 
air passenger travel shows us that an acceptable balance 
between freedom to travel and security can be found 
despite a high level of menace. 
Because almost everybody has some personal expe-
rience of travel benefi ts and drawbacks, passenger air 
transport easily caught the attention of the public and 
the media. On the other hand people hardly ever spent 
a thought on air cargo. In the last few years the growth 
of global trade has made it much more visible – but un-
fortunately also to the wrong people: today terrorists 
are aware of the option to strike civil aviation by placing 
a bomb in the air cargo fl ow. The scheme originating 
from Yemen in 2010 failed – not because security meas-
ures were functioning well, but due to happenstance in 
form of an insider tip-off.
In passenger air transport a high level of protection 
against hi-jacking and bombing was implemented by 
a coordination of international effort. In air cargo it 
should also be possible to build up a workable secu-
rity system without killing off the business model and 
therefore encumbering global trade. A dedicated global 
security system has to be designed with the specifi cs of 
international air cargo in mind. But in cargo as well as 
in passenger services the solution will not be found by 
just improving technology, the human factor still poses 
the highest risks. 
We may assume that after the Yemen incident terror-
ists will have evaluated the outcome and are planning 
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a fresh attempt against a promising target – say a long-
range passenger aircraft with a US or maybe European 
or Israeli fl ag. Sadly we have to live with a cruel arms 
race between terrorists and security, but fortunately se-
curity has scored far better in the long run – so far. But it 
is quite probable that the »other guys« are preparing for 
their next strike right now. 
Endnotes
[1] This paper is based on presentations given by the author at the 
EBES Conference in June 2011 in Istanbul and the GARS-WIT Air 
Cargo Workshop in Wildau in October 2011.
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